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RIDING THE WAIVER: IN RE AMERICAN 
EXPRESS MERCHANTS’ LITIGATION AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE VINDICATION OF 
STATUTORY RIGHTS 
Abstract: On February 1, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held in In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation that a class action 
waiver was unenforceable because class litigation was the only economi-
cally feasible way for the plaintiffs to vindicate their statutory rights under 
the Sherman Act. In doing so, the Second Circuit properly balanced the 
policy underlying the Federal Arbitration Act and the policy favoring the 
vindication of rights provided by federal statute. This Comment argues 
that the Second Circuit properly interpreted the vindication of statutory 
rights analysis in light of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Introduction 
 Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925 in 
response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.1 
Congress intended to remedy this hostility with a national policy favor-
ing arbitration, placing arbitration agreements on an equal footing 
with all other contracts.2 Section 2, the FAA’s primary substantive provi-
                                                                                                                      
1 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution involving 
one or more neutral third-party arbitrators who are usually chosen by the disputing parties 
and whose decision is binding. Black’s Law Dictionary 119 (9th ed. 2009). In England, 
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements was justified on the ground that such agree-
ments were against public policy because they “oust the jurisdiction” of the courts. 
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1942) (citing 
Kill v. Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.) 532; 1 Wils. K.B. 129). Most American 
courts in the nineteenth century adopted this attitude. Id. at 984. 
Judicial hostility to arbitration traditionally has been expressed through two doctrines: 
(1) “revocability,” which allows parties to repudiate arbitration agreements at any time before 
the arbitrator’s award is made, and (2) “invalidity” or “unenforceability,” which flatly denies 
any remedy for the failure to honor an arbitration agreement. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
465 U.S. 1, 32 (1984). Congress intended the FAA to abolish the rule that agreements for 
arbitration will not be specifically enforced, so that whenever parties agree by contract to 
submit controversies to arbitration and one party refuses, the court will appoint an arbitrator 
and the arbitration will proceed. 66 Cong. Rec. 984 (1924) (statement of Sen. Thomas J. 
Walsh); see S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 2–3 (1924). 
2 See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008); Michael H. LeRoy, 
Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The “Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 
137, 174 (2011). 
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sion, provides parties with a way to avoid enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement.3 Specifically, the saving clause of section 2 provides that ar-
bitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save up-
on such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”4 
 After the FAA was enacted, courts initially excluded from 
arbitrability suits that asserted federal statutory claims.5 More recently, 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that these claims may be 
“appropriately resolved” through arbitration.6 According to the Court, 
federal statutory claims can be arbitrated only when arbitration can ef-
fectively vindicate the parties’ statutory rights.7 This is known as the 
                                                                                                                      
3 9 U.S.C. § 2; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983). 
4 9 U.S.C. § 2; Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746. The complete text of section 2 of the FAA 
provides: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereaf-
ter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the 
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration 
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
9 U.S.C. § 2. 
5 See David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights Doc-
trine, 60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 723, 723 (2012). Courts excluded federal statutory claims from 
arbitrability under what was known as the “non-arbitrability doctrine.” Id. The non-
arbitrability doctrine held that Congress did not intend for federal statutory claims to go to 
arbitration. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223 (1985); Horton, supra note 
5, at 723. The U.S. Supreme Court initially was concerned that arbitration’s informality 
would undermine the power of federal statutory schemes because arbitrators lack legal train-
ing and need not memorialize their decisions in writing. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431–
32, 35 (1953); Horton, supra note 5, at 730–33. This presented a problem because federal 
statutes may serve a societal interest that affects many more people than the parties in any 
particular case. Horton, supra note 5, at 731; see Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 
391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968). 
6 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000) (recognizing 
that the Supreme Court has enforced some arbitration agreements in the past); Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (compelling arbitration for a claim 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim even though the Act furthered 
important policies); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 628 (1985) (noting that arbitration agreements only change the forum and do not 
cause a party to forgo the substantive rights afforded by statute); see also Horton, supra note 
5, at 723–24 (discussing the Court’s changing attitude toward arbitration agreements). 
7 See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90, 92; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628; Horton, supra note 5, at 
723–24. 
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vindication of statutory rights analysis.8 The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit’s 2012 holding in In re American Express Merchants’ 
Litigation (Amex III ) offers an expansive interpretation of the vindica-
tion of statutory rights analysis that saves a small subset of suits from 
arbitrability.9 
 Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the factual and 
procedural background of Amex III and explores Supreme Court prece-
dent concerning the vindication of statutory rights analysis.10 Part II ex-
amines how the Second Circuit panel and the dissenting opinion in the 
denial for rehearing en banc reached different conclusions about the 
proper application of the vindication of statutory rights analysis.11 Final-
ly, Part III argues that the Second Circuit panel’s approach to applying 
the vindication of statutory rights analysis in Amex III is consistent with 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and is the proper outcome.12 
I. The History of Amex III and the Vindication of Statutory 
Rights Analysis 
 Section A of this Part explores the extensive factual and procedur-
al history of Amex III.13 Section B then provides an overview of the vin-
dication of statutory rights analysis as set forth by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in prior cases.14 
A. The Factual and Procedural Background of Amex III 
 In 2006, in In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, a group of 
plaintiffs filed a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York on behalf of all merchants that accept American 
Express (Amex) cards.15 They sued over the “Honor All Cards” provi-
                                                                                                                      
8 See Horton, supra note 5, at 724; see also infra notes 47–55 and accompanying text 
(discussing the vindication of statutory rights analysis). 
9 667 F.3d 204, 219 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-133); see In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex 
IV ), 681 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 2012) (order denying rehearing en banc); Horton, supra 
note 5, at 724. 
10 See infra notes 13–56 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 57–85 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 86–105 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 15–46 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 47–56 and accompanying text. 
15 Amex III, 667 F.3d at 207–08; In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., No. 03-CV-
9592(GBD), 2006 WL 662341, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d, 667 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012). The 
named plaintiffs were (1) California and New York corporations which operate businesses 
that have contracted with Amex, and (2) the National Supermarket Association, Inc., “a 
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sion in the Card Acceptance Agreement contract they signed with 
Amex.16 This provision required the plaintiff merchants to accept both 
Amex credit cards and charge cards at the same high discount rate.17 
 The plaintiffs claimed this Card Acceptance Agreement damaged 
them by forcing them either to accept both Amex charge and credit 
cards or to accept no Amex cards at all.18 This meant merchants could 
either pay high discount fees on Amex credit cards or lose sales from 
businesses, travelers, affluent consumers, and others who traditionally 
used Amex charge cards.19 The plaintiffs asserted that being forced to 
accept Amex credit cards harmed them because the discount rate 
Amex charged for its credit cards was at least thirty-five percent higher 
than those of other mass-market credit cards such as Visa, MasterCard, 
and Discover.20 Thus, the plaintiffs alleged, the requirement that they 
accept charge cards and credit cards together at the same fee amount-
ed to an illegal “tying arrangement” in violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.21 
 Notably, the Card Acceptance Agreement over which the plaintiffs 
sued contained a class action waiver provision and an arbitration 
                                                                                                                      
voluntary membership-based trade association that represents the interests of inde-
pendently owned supermarkets.” Amex III, 667 F.3d at 207. 
16 Amex III, 667 F.3d at 207–08. 
17 Id. at 208. The “discount rate” or “discount fees” are the fees a card issuer withholds 
as a percentage of each purchase made with its card at the merchant’s establishment. See 
id. A charge card requires its holder to pay the full balance at the end of each billing cycle. 
See id. at 207. A credit card allows the cardholder to pay only a portion of the amount. Id. 
According to the plaintiffs, Amex issued charge cards to corporate clients and affluent 
consumers who spent more money than credit card holders on their average purchase and 
were therefore “particularly attractive” to merchants. Id. 
18 See id. at 207–08. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The Sherman Act was designed to preserve free and un-
fettered competition as the rule of trade and to protect the public from conduct that unfairly 
destroys competition in the market. 15 U.S.C. § 1; Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 
U.S. 447, 458 (1993); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). Additionally, Con-
gress has given private citizens rights of action for injunctive relief and damages for antitrust 
violations without regard to the amount in controversy. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 
251, 266 (1972); see 15 U.S.C. § 15; 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006). Because the Sherman Act was 
designed to promote the national interest in a competitive economy, plaintiffs who assert 
claims under the Act are similar to private attorneys general who protect the public interest. 
See Am. Safety Equip. Corp., 391 F.2d at 826–27. 
The Supreme Court has defined a “tying arrangement” as “an agreement by a party to 
sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a different (or 
tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other sup-
plier.” N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5–6, cited in Amex III, 667 F.3d at 208 n.4. 
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clause.22 The class action waiver precluded signatories from bringing a 
class action or having any claim arbitrated on anything other than an 
individual basis.23 Amex moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the 
arbitration clause.24 In response, the district court dismissed the plain-
tiffs’ claims, holding that the arbitration clause was applicable to the 
dispute.25 The district court further held that issues related to the en-
forceability of an arbitration contract and its specific provisions are for 
the arbitrator to decide once arbitrability had been established.26 
 The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision.27 On appeal, 
in the 2009 case, In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation (Amex I ), a 
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the 
issue of a class action waiver’s enforceability was a matter for the court 
and not for the arbitrator.28 The Second Circuit further held that the 
class action waiver was not enforceable because the plaintiffs sustained 
their burden of showing that individual arbitration would be prohibi-
tively expensive and that a class action was the only way to vindicate 
                                                                                                                      
22 Amex III, 667 F.3d at 210; In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 2006 WL 662341, at *10. 
The Card Acceptance Agreement’s arbitration clause provided that “[a]ny Claim shall be 
resolved upon the election by you or us, by arbitration pursuant to this arbitration provi-
sion and the code of procedure of the national arbitration organization to which the 
Claim is referred in effect at the time the Claim is filed.” Amex III, 667 F.3d at 209. 
23 Amex III, 667 F.3d at 210. The relevant text of the class action waiver provides: 
 If arbitration is chosen by any party with respect to a claim, neither you 
nor we will have the right to litigate that claim in court or have a jury trial on 
that claim. . . . Further, you will not have the right to participate in a repre-
sentative capacity or as a member of any class of claimants pertaining to any 
claim subject to arbitration. The arbitrator’s decision will be final and bind-
ing. . . . 
 There shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a 
class action basis or on any basis involving Claims brought in a purported rep-
resentative capacity on behalf of the general public, other establishments 
which accept the Card (Service Establishments), or other persons or entities 
similarly situated. 
Id. at 209 (emphasis omitted). 
24 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 2006 WL 662341, at *1, *3. 
25 Id. at *3. 
26 Id. at *6 (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 
(2006); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 396–97 (1967); 
Campaniello Imps., Ltd. v. Saporiti Italia S.P.A., 117 F.3d 655, 667 (2d Cir. 1997)); see Amex 
III, 667 F.3d at 210. 
27 Amex III, 667 F.3d at 210. 
28 554 F.3d 300, 310–11 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Col-
ors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401, 2401 (2010). 
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their statutory rights under the Sherman Act.29 Amex then filed a peti-
tion for writ of certiorari.30 
 In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated 
the Second Circuit panel’s decision in Amex I.31 The Court then re-
manded the case for further consideration in light of its 2010 holding 
in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.32 In Stolt-Nielsen, the 
Court held that a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit 
to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding 
that the party agreed to do so.33 
 On remand in 2011, in In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation 
(Amex II), the Second Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Stolt-Nielsen did not affect its analysis in Amex I.34 The Second Circuit rea-
soned that Stolt-Nielsen only held that a party may not be compelled to 
submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for conclud-
ing that the party agreed to do so.35 The Second Circuit concluded that 
Stolt-Nielsen did not require all class action waivers to be deemed per se 
enforceable, and thus declined to order class arbitration in Amex II.36 
 In 2011, shortly after the Second Circuit panel’s ruling in Amex II, 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.37 In 
Concepcion, the Court held that the FAA preempted California common 
law, which deemed most class action arbitration waivers in consumer 
contracts unconscionable.38 Reaffirming the liberal federal policy favor-
ing arbitration agreements, the Supreme Court reasoned that, by re-
quiring the availability of class-wide arbitration, the California rule in-
terfered with fundamental attributes of arbitration and created a 
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.39 
                                                                                                                      
29 Id. at 315–16; see Amex III, 667 F.3d at 210–11. 
30 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 
2401 (2010) (No. 08-1473), 2009 WL 1511739, at *1. 
31 Am. Express Co., 130 S. Ct. at 2401. 
32 Id.; see Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010). 
33 Stolt-Nielson, 130 S. Ct. at 1775. 
34 634 F.3d 187, 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2011); see Stolt-Nielson, 130 S. Ct. at 1775; Amex III, 667 
F.3d at 212; Amex I, 554 F.3d at 310–11. The court reasoned that a class action was the 
plaintiffs’ only economically feasible means of enforcing their statutory rights. Amex II, 634 
F.3d at 198. 
35 Amex II, 634 F.3d at 198. 
36 Id. at 200; see Amex III, 667 F.3d at 213–14. 
37 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753; see Amex II, 634 F.3d at 200. 
38 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
39 Id. at 1748–49. 
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 In 2012, in Amex III, a Second Circuit panel reconsidered the class 
action waiver issue in light of Concepcion.40 The Amex III panel ruled that 
Concepcion did not affect its Amex I holding that the class action waiver 
provision at issue was unenforceable.41 It reasoned that because Concep-
cion did not overrule two previous Supreme Court cases on which Amex 
I relied, the Second Circuit’s analysis in Amex I remained valid.42 
 After Amex III, an active judge of the Second Circuit requested a 
poll on whether to rehear the case en banc.43 In May 2012, however, in 
In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation (Amex IV ), the Second Circuit 
issued an order denying rehearing.44 Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs issued 
a dissenting opinion, contending that the Second Circuit’s Amex III 
opinion created a circuit split with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding in the 2012 case, Coneff v. AT&T Corp.45 He also 
provided reasons distinct from those offered by the Ninth Circuit for 
why the vindication of statutory rights analysis did not invalidate the 
arbitration agreement.46 
B. The Vindication of Statutory Rights Analysis 
 Under the vindication of statutory rights analysis, an arbitration 
agreement can be invalidated if the costs of arbitration are great 
enough that prospective litigants are unable to effectively vindicate the 
rights granted to them by the statute under which they are bringing 
                                                                                                                      
40 See Amex III, 667 F.3d at 206, 212. 
41 See id. at 216–17. 
42 Id.; see Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 89; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628; see also infra notes 47–56 
(discussing these cases in detail). 
43 Amex IV, 681 F.3d at 139. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 142, 145 ( Jacobs, C.J., dissenting); see Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 
1157 (9th Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs in Coneff entered into a service agreement containing 
an arbitration clause with a class action waiver. Coneff, 673 F.3d at 1157. When AT&T 
moved to compel arbitration, the plaintiffs argued that the arbitration provision was unen-
forceable because, even after Concepcion, class action waivers that preclude vindication of 
statutory rights are unenforceable. Id. at 1158. The Ninth Circuit held that because the 
arbitration clause contained fee-shifting provisions like those in Concepcion, “aggrieved 
customers who filed claims would be essentially guaranteed to be made whole.” Id. at 1159. 
The Ninth Circuit distinguished the inability to vindicate statutory rights on an individual 
basis from the incentive to do so. Id. The court acknowledged that the costs of pursuing 
individual arbitration may provide a disincentive to vindicate rights provided by a federal 
statute, but called these “unrelated policy concerns” that, “however worthwhile,” cannot 
undermine the FAA. Id. 
46 Amex IV, 681 F.3d at 146–49 ( Jacobs, C.J., dissenting). 
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suit.47 The U.S. Supreme Court set forth this analysis in its 1985 deci-
sion in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. and its 2000 
ruling in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph.48 
 Mitsubishi was the first Supreme Court case to establish the vindica-
tion of statutory rights analysis.49 In Mitsubishi, the Court held that arbi-
tration is permissible “so long as the prospective litigant may effectively 
vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”50 In such 
cases, the policy interests underlying that statutory cause of action are 
protected.51 Thus, the Court’s holding ensured that an arbitral forum 
would preserve access to the same rights as would be available in 
court.52 The Court did not elaborate, however, on what it means for a 
litigant to “effectively vindicate its statutory cause of action.”53 
 Additionally, in Green Tree, the Supreme Court addressed the im-
pact of costs on the vindication of statutory rights analysis.54 The Court 
noted that evidence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant 
from effectively vindicating statutory rights in the arbitral forum.55 The 
Court further held that when a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement on the basis that arbitration would be prohibitively expen-
sive, that party bears the burden of demonstrating the likelihood of in-
curring such costs.56 
II. Varying Interpretations of the Vindication of Statutory 
Rights Analysis as Applied to In re American Express 
Merchants’ Litigation 
 The Second Circuit panel’s 2012 decision in Amex III and Chief 
Judge Dennis Jacobs’s dissent later that year from the Second Circuit’s 
denial of rehearing en banc in In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation 
(Amex IV ) offer two different interpretations of the vindication of statu-
                                                                                                                      
47 See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637; Horton, supra note 5, at 
733–36 (summarizing the vindication of statutory rights analysis). 
48 See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637; Horton, supra note 5, at 
733–36. 
49 See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637. 
50 Id. 
51 See id. 
52 Id. at 638. 
53 Id. at 637. 
54 See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90–92. The plaintiff contended that the arbitration agree-
ment’s silence with respect to costs and fees created a risk that she would incur prohibitive 
arbitration costs if required to pursue her claim in an arbitral forum. Id. at 90. 
55 See id. at 92. 
56 See id. 
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tory rights analysis.57 Section A of this Part discusses the Second Cir-
cuit’s use of the vindication of statutory rights analysis to invalidate a 
class action waiver.58 Section B then examines Chief Judge Jacobs’s con-
trary view that the vindication of statutory rights analysis should not 
restrict the federal government’s preference for arbitration.59 
A. The Second Circuit’s Opinion 
 The Second Circuit held in Amex III that the vindication of statuto-
ry rights analysis invalidated the class action waiver contained in the 
merchants’ Card Acceptance Agreement.60 In reaching its decision, the 
court invoked the analysis articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
1985 case, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., and the 
2000 case, Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph.61 
 The Second Circuit first articulated an expansive reading of the 
vindication of statutory rights analysis, reasoning that this interpreta-
tion best preserved the plaintiffs’ ability to recover on their claims.62 
Because the Supreme Court merely established, but did not define, the 
vindication of statutory rights analysis in Mitsubishi, the Second Circuit 
had little guidance in its interpretation.63 The Second Circuit noted 
that a prospective litigant must be able to “effectively vindicate its statu-
tory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”64 It then examined dicta 
from a footnote in Mitsubishi, indicating that it would violate public pol-
icy if contracts were permitted to operate as prospective waivers of par-
ties’ rights to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations.65 
 Applying that language to Amex III, the Second Circuit reasoned 
that the Card Acceptance Agreement’s class action waiver removed the 
plaintiffs’ only reasonably feasible means of recovery, and thus operat-
ed as a prospective waiver of the plaintiffs’ rights to pursue statutory 
                                                                                                                      
57 See In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex IV), 681 F.3d 139, 142–49 (2d Cir. 2012) 
( Jacobs, C.J., dissenting) (order denying rehearing en banc); In re Am. Express Merchs.’ 
Litig. (Amex III ), 667 F.3d 204, 210–11, 214–19 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-133). 
58 See infra notes 60–75 and accompanying text. 
59 See infra notes 76–85 and accompanying text. 
60 Amex III, 667 F.3d at 219. 
61 Id. at 210, 214; see Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90–92 
(2000); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636–40 
(1985). 
62 Amex III, 667 F.3d at 213–17. 
63 See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632, 637 n.19; Amex III, 667 F.3d at 214. 
64 See Amex III, 667 F.3d at 214 (emphasis added) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632). 
65 Id.; see Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19. 
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remedies.66 According to the court, this was a ground for revoking the 
class action waiver, thereby triggering the saving clause of the FAA and 
rendering the arbitration agreement invalid.67 Such prospective waivers 
in an arbitration agreement, the Second Circuit reasoned, would ren-
der parties unable to vindicate their statutory rights.68 
 The Second Circuit then concluded that the costs of arbitration, 
discussed by the Supreme Court in Green Tree, referred to costs that 
would not have been incurred had the case been brought in court, ra-
ther than in an arbitral forum.69 The Second Circuit examined what 
circumstances could create a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pur-
sue a statutory remedy for an antitrust violation.70 In doing so, the court 
again looked to Green Tree, which suggested that a party can invalidate an 
arbitration agreement “on the ground that arbitration would be prohib-
itively expensive.”71 The Second Circuit reasoned that, given the high 
cost of bringing an antitrust claim against Amex, arbitration on an indi-
vidual basis would be so cost-prohibitive as to make pursuing that claim 
effectively impossible without the use of a class action.72 In many cases, 
the cost of individually litigating a claim would be high enough to offset 
any recovery that a single plaintiff could receive.73 Thus, according to 
the Amex III court, a class action waiver mandating individual arbitration 
would prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights.74 Accord-
ingly, the Second Circuit ruled that the arbitration clause in the Card 
Acceptance Agreement, which contained the class action waiver, was 
unenforceable.75 
                                                                                                                      
66 Amex III, 667 F.3d at 211. 
67 Id.; see Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
68 Amex III, 667 F.3d at 214. 
69 Id. at 217; see Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90–91. 
70 Amex III, 667 F.3d at 216–17. 
71 Id. at 216 (quoting Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 91–92). 
72 See id. The court noted that a class action may make it financially feasible for parties 
to bring claims they would not otherwise be able to pursue. Id. at 214. As the court ex-
plained, in some instances “[e]conomic reality dictates that [a] petitioner’s suit proceed as 
a class action or not at all.” Id. (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 
(1974)). 
73 See id. at 218. In this case, it would have cost the plaintiffs between $300,000 and 
$2,000,000 to hire an expert witness to assist in their claim. Id. at 217. The most that any 
one plaintiff might expect to receive in damages, however, was $38,549. Id. at 218. 
74 See id. at 218. 
75 See id. at 219. 
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B. Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs’s Dissent 
 Whereas the Second Circuit panel interpreted the vindication of 
statutory rights analysis in a way favorable to preserving plaintiffs’ right 
to recover, Chief Judge Jacobs, in his dissent to the denial of rehearing 
en banc, interpreted it in light of the federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion.76 Chief Judge Jacobs argued that the policy underlying the FAA 
contradicts the Second Circuit’s holding in Amex III.77 The Second Cir-
cuit’s opinion, he argued, could be used to invalidate any arbitration 
agreement containing a class action waiver.78 This contradicted Su-
preme Court precedent and the FAA’s liberal policy favoring arbitra-
tion.79 The Chief Judge also noted that even if a claim is “economically 
feasible,” plaintiffs are never guaranteed to recover the damages, costs, 
attorney’s fees, expert charges, and other expenses they seek.80 
 Additionally, whereas the Amex III panel concluded that the “costs 
of arbitration” mentioned in Green Tree applied to costs incurred as a 
result of arbitration, Chief Judge Jacobs argued that they only referred 
to the costs of access to the arbitral forum.81 Accordingly, he argued 
that the panel had misinterpreted Green Tree.82 Under his interpreta-
tion, when Green Tree described the preclusive effects of “large arbitra-
tion costs,” it was referring to the costs of access to an arbitral forum 
itself, not the costs of supporting a claim in the manner the arbitral fo-
rum required.83 Moreover, Chief Judge Jacobs drew a distinction be-
                                                                                                                      
76 See Amex IV, 681 F.3d at 143 ( Jacobs, C.J., dissenting). Two judges, José A. Cabranes 
and Debra Ann Livingston, concurred in Chief Judge Jacobs’s dissent. Id. 
77 Id. at 143, 146. 
78 Id. at 143–44. Although the Second Circuit suggested a case-by-case approach, Chief 
Judge Jacobs opined that Amex III’s statement that class actions may be the only economi-
cally feasible way to vindicate a claim offered plaintiffs a way to render class action waivers 
categorically void. Id. 
79 Id. at 145. 
80 Id. at 144. Chief Judge Jacobs went on to note that such a result is “rarely achieved 
by even the most successful litigants.” Id. 
81 Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 81; see Amex IV, 681 F.3d at 142–49 ( Jacobs, C.J., dissenting). 
82 Amex IV, 681 F.3d at 147 ( Jacobs, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Jacobs also argued 
that the panel had misinterpreted Mitsubishi. Id.; see Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19. Specif-
ically, he stated that when the Supreme Court condemned contracts that constituted a 
prospective waiver of a party’s statutory rights, it was concerned with an arbitral panel that 
might refuse to apply American law to a federal statutory claim. Amex IV, 681 F.3d at 147 
( Jacobs, C.J., dissenting); see Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19. The issue in Mitsubishi was the 
arbitrability of federal statutory claims arising under a valid arbitration clause providing 
for international arbitration. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 616–17. 
83 Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 81; Amex IV, 681 F.3d at 147 ( Jacobs, C.J., dissenting). The 
Chief Judge stated that these costs were those enumerated in Green Tree, such as “filing 
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tween these arbitration costs, which he claimed would render arbitra-
tion agreements invalid, and the costs of individually litigating an ex-
pensive claim in court or in an arbitral forum, which would not.84 Chief 
Judge Jacobs reasoned that the fact that a claim is expensive to litigate 
does not mean that the claim cannot be litigated, and therefore does 
not preclude parties from vindicating their rights.85 
III. The Second Circuit’s Approach Better Comports with 
Supreme Court Precedent 
 In Amex III, the Second Circuit correctly interpreted the vindication 
of statutory rights analysis as articulated by the Supreme Court in Green 
Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph in 2000 and Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. in 1985.86 The Second Circuit properly 
balanced the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration with the federal 
policy of protecting an individual’s ability to vindicate statutory rights by 
preserving the right to a class action.87 By contrast, Chief Judge Jacobs’ 
dissent in the 2012 case, In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation (Amex 
IV ), offered a pro-arbitration interpretation of the competing interests 
underlying the vindication of statutory rights analysis.88 
 The Second Circuit properly balanced the competing federal poli-
cies of favoring arbitration and protecting the ability of prospective liti-
gants to vindicate their federal statutory rights.89 This approach, broad-
ly interpreting Green Tree and Mitsubishi, called for a case-by-case 
examination of whether a class action waiver would effectively preclude 
a party from vindicating its federal statutory rights.90 Accordingly, it 
                                                                                                                      
fees, arbitrators’ costs, and other arbitration expenses.” Amex IV, 681 F.3d at 147 ( Jacobs, 
C.J., dissenting) (quoting Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 84). 
84 Amex IV, 681 F.3d at 147 ( Jacobs, C.J., dissenting). 
85 Id. 
86 In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (Amex III ), 667 F.3d 204, 217 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 
12-133); see Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90–92 (2000); Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985); see also Maureen 
A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 767, 782, 
788, 794 (2012) (explaining how the FAA’s policy favoring arbitration interacts with other 
federal statutory rights). 
87 See Amex III, 667 F.3d at 217; see also Weston, supra note 86, at 782. 
88 See 681 F.3d 139, 147–49 (2d Cir. 2012) ( Jacobs, C.J., dissenting) (order denying re-
hearing en banc). 
89 See Amex III, 667 F.3d at 218–19. 
90 See id.; Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 623, 642–43 (2012). 
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does not provide a blanket ban on class action waivers.91 The Second 
Circuit instead suggested that arbitration should be allowed in a partic-
ular case so long as it does not have the effect of precluding the vindi-
cation of federal statutory rights.92 
 Conversely, the dissent’s approach improperly balances these 
competing policies by favoring arbitration over affording private parties 
the ability to effectively vindicate their statutory rights.93 By interpreting 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Green Tree as limited to costs strictly re-
lated to the mechanics of arbitration, Chief Judge Jacobs would drasti-
cally narrow the scope of the vindication of statutory rights analysis.94 
As a result, class action waivers would proliferate, potentially curtailing 
or even eliminating the class action’s role in private enforcement of 
federal statutes.95 The dissent’s approach would also elevate the liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration over the ability of parties to vindicate 
their rights through private enforcement.96 
 Additionally, the Second Circuit’s approach better comports with 
the Supreme Court’s articulation of the vindication of statutory rights 
analysis.97 In Green Tree, the Court held that an arbitration agreement 
could be invalidated on the ground that arbitration would be prohibi-
tively expensive.98 In Mitsubishi, the Court noted that if a contract oper-
ated as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory reme-
dies for an antitrust violation, it would go against public policy.99 
Accordingly, in Amex III, the Second Circuit followed Supreme Court 
precedent by holding that the vindication of statutory rights should 
prevail over the federal policy favoring arbitration.100 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court has also stated that the purpose of affording parties dis-
cretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, 
streamlined procedures tailored to each dispute.101 The Second Circuit 
                                                                                                                      
91 See Amex III, 667 F.3d at 219. 
92 See id.; Gilles & Friedman, supra note 90, at 642–43. 
93 See Amex IV, 681 F.3d at 143–49 ( Jacobs, C.J., dissenting). 
94 See id. at 147–48. 
95 See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 90, at 625–28. 
96 See Amex IV, 681 F.3d at 142, 145 ( Jacobs, C.J., dissenting); see also Gilles & Friedman, 
supra note 90, at 625–28 (discussing the history of private parties enforcing public laws 
through class actions). 
97 Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92. 
98 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637. 
99 See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637; Amex III, 667 F.3d at 218–19. 
100 See Amex III, 667 F.3d at 218–19. 
101 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011); see also Horton, 
supra note 5, at 727, 759 (explaining that the federal policy favoring arbitration is intended 
to facilitate more efficient dispute resolution). 
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recognized, in accordance with Green Tree and Mitsubishi, that this inter-
est is not served if the arbitration process is designed to preclude the 
vindication of a party’s rights under a federal statute.102 
 On November 9, 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
Amex III.103 The Court should uphold the Second Circuit’s ruling be-
cause it is more consistent with the Court’s own decisions in Green Tree 
and Mitsubishi.104 Additionally, adopting the dissent’s approach would 
result in the proliferation of class action waivers and decrease the viabil-
ity of the class action as a private enforcement mechanism for antitrust 
violations.105 
Conclusion 
 The Second Circuit panel’s decision in Amex III and Chief Judge 
Dennis Jacobs’ dissent in Amex IV differed in their interpretations of the 
vindication of statutory rights analysis. The Second Circuit panel inter-
preted the vindication of statutory rights analysis broadly, taking “costs 
of arbitration” to mean costs of litigation that arise while pursuing a 
claim in the arbitral forum. Under this approach, the court invalidated 
a class action waiver, holding that a class action was the only economi-
cally feasible way for the plaintiffs to pursue their claims. Chief Judge 
Jacobs, however, took a narrow approach to the vindication of statutory 
rights doctrine, interpreting “costs of arbitration” to mean only the 
costs of accessing the arbitral forum. Under this approach, the dissent 
would have enforced the class action waiver because the costs of access-
ing the arbitral forum did not preclude arbitration. 
 Upon review, the Supreme Court should uphold the Second Cir-
cuit panel’s decision because it properly balances the policy favoring 
the vindication of statutory rights against the policy favoring arbitra-
tion. Moreover, the panel’s approach is consistent with Supreme Court 
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